## TODO & Prose Outline >[!todo] >- [x] Determine where to integrate [[Scale Domain Analysis Framework for Hawaii's Sharetaker Transitions]] >- [ ] Merge with [[4.5 3rd Food Regime - Local Food, Global Capital]] >- [ ] Figure out where to fit in [[2024-11-16 sign-value and "local" food]] >- [ ] Determine if there is anything useful from [[2025-01-12 accumulation through localization]] >- [ ] [[2025-01-13 Eggs - Accumulation via Localization]] >- [ ] Review [[Local Food, Global Capital - 5 sentences]] > [!abstract] From [[September 2024 Outline]] >![[September 2024 Outline#Chapter 5 4.5 3rd Food Regime - Local Food, Global Capital Local Food, Global Capital Third Regime Sharetakers in 21st Century Hawaii]] | **Section** | **Pages** | Words | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | ------------- | | **I. Introduction: The ‘Local Shift’ in Global Capital** | 3-4 | 900 - 1,200 | | **II. Theoretical Framework: Accumulation Through Localization & Scale Domains** | 6-7 | 1,800 - 2,100 | | **III. Case Studies: The Rise of Sharetakers in Hawai‘i** | 10-12 | 3,000 - 3,600 | | **IV. State Policy & Neo-Productivism** | 3-4 | 900 - 1,200 | | **V. Risk Implications: New Dependencies & Market Fragility** | 3-4 | 900 - 1,200 | | **VI. Conclusion: Paradoxes of Localization & Food Sovereignty** | 2 | 600 - 800 | # Chapter 5: Local Food, Global Capital: Third Regime Sharetakers in 21st Century Hawaii ## I. Introduction: The 'Local Shift' in Global Capital - Context of third food regime transitions - Concept of *accumulation through localization* - Borrowing from Harvey's *accumulation through dispossession* (CITATION), this chapter documents recent agricultural development and investments in Hawaii, highlight the focus on goods for endemic consumption as a novel spatial strategy by corporate actors in the modern food regime. This approach is buoyed by Hawaii's long held interest in increasing food self-sufficiency and is in the process of capturing multiple local food sectors with scales of production previously unseen in the islands. The surplus value from this production will accrue less to Hawaii's rural homes and communities and more so to these actors shareholders. This strategy, which I term accumulation by localization, captures Hawaii's hunger for local food but exposes the archipelago to new risks in the process. - Research question: How does food system risk shift as agribusinesses invest in production for local consumption? In 2016, Hawaii's last sugarcane plantation, a production site on Maui, Hawaii Commercial & Sugar (HC&S) shut down its sole running sugarcane In 2016, Hawaii's last sugarcane plantation ceased operations. Hawaii Commercial & Sugar (HC&S) decision to shutter its Maui production marked the death of King Sugar. across its s Hawaii's last sugar plantation, Two years later, HC&S parent company Alexander & Baldwin sold the 41,000 acre holding to Mahi Pono LLC, a partnership between Pomona Farming LLC, a California based agrocapital investment firm, and Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP Investments), one of Canada's largest government pension investment managers. While the closure of HC&S marked the end of over a century of colonial agribusiness control of the islands' land and water resources, the acquisition by Mahi Pono heralded a novel form of capital accumulation through agriculture, and a significant shift in Hawaii's agricultural landscape. Unlike the export-oriented plantations that had dominated Hawaii's agriculture for over a century, Mahi Pono announced its intention to grow food primarily for local consumption. This was not an isolated case. Across Hawaii, similar large-scale agricultural investments have emerged: Villa Rose's industrial egg operation on Oahu, Hawaii Meats' consolidation of meat processing statewide, and various other corporate agricultural ventures, all targeting local rather than export markets. These investments represent more than just a change in market orientation. They signal the emergence of what I term *accumulation through localization*—a new strategy within the third food regime where global capital coopts the narratives and markets of food system localization. This strategy inverts the traditional export orientation of corporate agriculture in Hawaii, instead pursuing profit through control of local food markets. While these ventures adopt the language of food security, sustainability, and local production, their scale, ownership structures, and market approaches represent fundamental discontinuities with Hawaii's existing agricultural system. The emergence of these "sharetakers"—my term for corporations pursuing *accumulation through localization*—reflects broader shifts in the global food regime. As McMichael [-@mcmichael_2009] notes, the third food regime is characterized by corporate power, market consolidation, and the financialization of agriculture. However, in Hawaii, this regime has taken a distinctive form. Rather than pursuing what McMichael calls "food from nowhere," these corporate actors have embraced a "food from somewhere" narrative, specifically targeting Hawaii's persistent concerns about food import dependence. This chapter examines how these sharetakers are restructuring Hawaii's food system and the new risks this restructuring produces. Through analysis of three major case studies—Mahi Pono, Villa Rose, and Hawaii Meats—I demonstrate how these investments represent critical discontinuities across three key domains: production scale, economic scale, and social scale. These discontinuities are not merely differences in size; they represent fundamental transformations in how foods are produced, how agricultural decisions are made, and how value is captured and distributed. The scale of these operations—orders of magnitude larger than existing local producers—creates market power that smaller operators cannot match. Their corporate ownership structures shift decision-making from local communities to distant boardrooms. Their capital requirements necessitate returns uncommon in agriculture, driving market consolidation that %%threatens to%% displaces existing producers. As Suryanata [-@suryanata_2002] demonstrated in her analysis of earlier agricultural transitions in Hawaii, increased local production often leads to displacement of existing producers rather than reduced import dependence. This chapter addresses the question: How does food system risk shift as agribusinesses invest in production for local consumption? Drawing on discontinuity theory and scale domain analysis, I examine how these sharetakers create new vulnerabilities even as they promise increased local food production. While they may superficially align with state goals to double local food production, their approach to *accumulation through localization* may ultimately leave Hawaii's food system more, not less, vulnerable to disruption. The analysis reveals a critical paradox: as global capital "goes local" in Hawaii's food system, it creates discontinuities that may undermine the very food security it claims to enhance. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for policy makers, planners, and communities seeking to build genuine food system resilience in Hawaii. >[!warning] Add a note about my work on behalf of Mahi Pono and Villa Rose > Highlight that the chapter is intended as analysis not indictment > ## II. Theoretical Framework: Scale Domains and Food System Transformation ### A. Third Food Regime Context As an approach to framing capital accumulation through global agricultures, one means of bounding food regimes has been through elucidation of 'complexes', arrangements of production, distribution, institutional, and political relations around specific crops and products. From the late 19th to early-mid 20th centuries the Colonial-Diasporic regime is defined by flows of tropical products (e.g., sugar, tea, coffee, bananas, etc) from colonies and wheat and meat from settler states towards Europe, as expressions of British hegemonic power [@friedmann.mcmichael_1989]. Post-World War II into the 1980s a Mercantile-Industrial regime was defined by American surplus in wheat, livestock and feed, and durable (i.e., stable or manufactured) foods [@friedmann.mcmichael_1989]. In the language of World-Systems theory, the movement pattern of these key complexes shifted from periphery state exporting in the first regime to core state exporting in the second regime. The recent 'third' regime, termed variously the corporate food regime [@mcmichael_2005] or corporate-environmental food regime [@friedmann_2005] identifies the ascendance of global corporate actors in agro-food system capital accumulation. Thus tethered to trends in corporate ownership, agro-food systems became increasingly linked with finance capital and its myriad forms and institutions of investment. This financialization and its logics thus become a key facet for analyzing the third regime [@burch.lawrence_2009]. @talbot_2015 emphasizes the - 1st Colonial Diasporic regime: 2 complexes: tropical products and basic grains, primarily wheat [@talbot_2015] - 2nd Mercantile-Industrial regime: 3 complexes: wheat, livestock/feed, durable foods [@talbot_2015 per @friedmann_1982 ] - 3rd Corporate-Environmental regime characteristics - @friedmann_2005 - @burch.lawrence_2009 - @mcmichael_2009 - @plahe.etal_2013 - @talbot_2015 - @friedmann_2016 - "The term ‘corporate food regime’ implies a unified corporate agenda that is acted upon successfully; it must be opposed for the good of humanity; farmers are uniting and leading a movement that understands this battle. This formulation collapses the central observations of food regime analysis – changes in landscapes, crops, classes and inter-state relations. It forecloses questions about the dynamics of agrifood capitals themselves, their relations to other sectors, to finance, indeed even to states" - fresh fruit and vegetable complex - The third global food regime from the 1980s to today, framed by the politics of neoliberalism and evidenced in the “corporatization of agriculture and agro-exports” (McMichael, 2005), has shifted the “locus of control for food security away from the nation-state to the world market” (Plahe et. al, 2013). TODO: WRITE UP A SHORT SUMMARY OF 3RD REGIME TAKES AND MOVE ON TO NEXT SECTION!!!! - Financialization of agriculture - Co-optation of alternative food narratives - @friedmann_2016 : "Once capitalist firms and international organizations adopt the rhetorics of their critics, those wishing to change food systems must adapt to a new game. When corporations talk of making industrial agriculture sustainable, sometimes through using specific techniques pioneered by farmers, it is much harder to convince people to oppose the system as a whole and support a better one." ### B. Accumulation through Localization > [!todo] Draw from [[2025-01-12 accumulation through localization]] #### Spatial Strategy: Localization as a Capitalist Frontier #### Co-option of Local Food's Sign Value [[2024-11-16 sign-value and "local" food]] #### Dislocal: Localization as a Mechanism of Dispossession See @suryanata_2000 on displacement when local production increases #### Environmental and Social Contradictions ### C. Scale Domain Analysis Framework - Discontinuity theory & panarchy: @sundstrom_2018, @sundstrom.allen_2019, @holling_1992 - Production discontinuities - Economic discontinuities - Social discontinuities - ==%%CONSIDER REMOVAL%% Introduction of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for market concentration - @howard_2016 for use and critique - @deteix.etal_2024 on use, limitations, and future research direction ## III. The Rise of Sharetakers in Hawaii ### A. Common Characteristics Overview - (i.e. sharetakers defined) - Scale: Orders of magnitude larger than existing producers - Ownership: Distant capital, corporate structure - Intent: Narrative emphasis on local needs and environmental management Building from the theoretical scaffold of *accumulation through localization* we now explore actors pursuing the strategy as case studies. These term *sharetaker* is applied based on their strategic alignment with key facets of *accumulation through localization* and, as will be demonstrated, the impact of their investments. What defines a *sharetaker*? ### B. Case Studies >[!abstract] For each case study follow the [[Sharetaker Case Study Format]] Analyze and theorize their narrative, political and market strategies in the pre- mid- and post-COVID eras. How are they cultivating narratives, growing favor, and harvesting marketshare? What norms do they benefit from and what nuances do they elide? How has policy been a harrow in their efforts? > - Introduction & Early Markets > - Recent (pre-existing) Market Structure > - General Description of Project > - Firm & Ownership > - Development Timeline > - Scale Domains & Key Discontinuities > - Production Scale > - Economic Scale > - Social Scale > >- Intent: via narrative analysis? > - Name choice! > - Policy influence >- Market Actions / Effects > - Market concentration metrics > - COVID-19 impacts and responses #### [[Mahi Pono]] (Fruits and Vegetables) #### [[Waialua Fresh]] (Eggs) #### [[Hawaii Meats]] (Meat Processing) >[!abstract] Sidebar on [[Piggly Wiggly]] ## V. Neo-productivism and State Support - Role of state policies in legitimizing Sharetakers - Alignment with doubling local food production goals - Policy frameworks favoring large-scale operations - Contrast with historical state support for diverse agriculture - *Highlight how local food goals became a rationale for support of these investments - the unintended consequences of advocacy* - Varying forms of support: vocal action from Governors vs no action from legislatures ==Was state action "central to the formulation of hegemony" [@jakobsen_2021, p. 4] ?== - Pre-regime: - 1st regime: yes? the regime literally took over the state.. - 2nd regime: IDK - 3rd regime: - state (Gov Ige) certainly seems to be leaning in on neo-productivism - Legislature didnt intervene on meat processing consolidation - Egg standards pushed by Villa rose in legislature - Water rights fights with Mahi Pono --- # Notes & Ideas ![[Scale Domain Analysis Framework for Hawaii's Sharetaker Transitions]] >[!abstract] @suryanata_2002 on internal market competition vs displacement of imports >- “Between 1994 and 1999, the acreage of vegetables and melons on the island of Oahu more than quadrupled” [Go to annotation](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/2WZEP6J8?page=81&annotation=P8YD56Z2) ([Suryanata, 2002, p. 81](zotero://select/library/items/JXMX8W3K)) >- “regardless of the dramatic increase in vegetable production on Oahu, the total market share of fresh vegetables grown in the state remained relatively constant throughout the 1990s at 29 to 31 percent” [Go to annotation](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/2WZEP6J8?page=81&annotation=YSF4JEZP) ([Suryanata, 2002, p. 81](zotero://select/library/items/JXMX8W3K)) >- “Rather than substituting for the fresh produce shipped in from the U.S. mainland, the growth in production on Oahu apparently occurred at the expense of farms on the other islands in Hawaii.” [Go to annotation](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/2WZEP6J8?page=81&annotation=KU7HSPIF) ([Suryanata, 2002, p. 81](zotero://select/library/items/JXMX8W3K)) Will mahi Pono and villa rose do the same? key history and question to ask. Kautsky would presumably think so.. >- “Wholesalers and supermarkets have pointed out that, with few exceptions, the problem of doing business with local growers is the inconsistent and unreliable supply.” [Go to annotation](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/2WZEP6J8?page=81&annotation=TLR66EFM) ([Suryanata, 2002, p. 81](zotero://select/library/items/JXMX8W3K)) >- “Successful vegetable farms, such as the medium and large “new” diversified farms that took over the former sugar lands on Oahu, are clearly the ones that are able to address this problem. These farms have more capacity to plan and control market supply, which increases their reliability” [Go to annotation](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/2WZEP6J8?page=81&annotation=LAAVKASW) ([Suryanata, 2002, p. 81](zotero://select/library/items/JXMX8W3K))